Rolling coverage of the day’s political developments as they happen, including day two of the supreme court hearing to decide if Boris Johnson’s five-week suspension of parliament was lawful
- ‘Very little time remaining’ - Summary of Juncker’s speech to MEPs
- Supreme court hearing - What you need to know
Eadie says even Lord Pannick, who represents Gina Miller, accepts that it can be legitimate for the executive to obtain political advantage from prorogation.
If this is the case, how can a court decide what level of political advantage is acceptable, and what level is not.
Prorogation has been used by the government to gain a legislative and so political advantage. One of the most notable examples of that was its use to facilitate the speedy passage of what became the Parliament Act 1949. Under section 2 of the Parliament Act 1911 a non-money bill could only be enacted without the consent of the House of Lords if it was passed in three successive sessions by the House of Commons. In order to procure the speedy enactment of the 1949 Act the government arranged for a session of minimal length in 1948. Parliament was prorogued on 13 September 1948 to the following day. Following the passage of the parliament bill by the House of Commons, it was then prorogued again on 25 October 1948. Accordingly, even if the prorogation under consideration in the present case was, as the claimant and the interveners contend, designed to advance the government’s political agenda regarding withdrawal from the European Union rather than preparations for the Queen’s speech, that is not territory in which a court can enter with judicial review.
This is from the FT’s legal commentator, David Allen Green.
Interesting that there is now not even any lip-service at the Supreme Court that the prorogation was for a new Queen's Speech
Government submissions seem to be that the prorogation power stands, whatever its purpose and effect